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ON THE MEANING(S) OF „CAPACITY” IN THE 
LITERATURE AND PRACTICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
REFORM IN TRANSITIONAL COUNTRIES -
Searching for Clarity (with an application to local government in Serbia)
>A Advice-giving, at least in its recorded form, can be traced to Niccolo Machiavelli’s The Prince—and 
iq probably much earlier. A particular form of advice-giving, however, is of more recent vintage. Here, the 
jß author speaks about „capacity building” (hereafter referred to as CB) that involves the provision of 
9Í technical assistance to organizational units, frequently governments, so that their performance can be 
ni improved. The assistance may come from a variety of sources; it may be aimed at different kinds of 
recipients such as the central government, local governments and non-governmental organizations 
A) (NGOs). The assistance can take various forms and, the assistance may emphasize different knowledge 
iß and skills intended to enhance capacity. The breath of assistance and its intent to enhance CB is, 
jq paradoxically its strength and its weakness. This, in essence, is the argument of the paper.
') CB is a term that was used in the late 1970s to describe 
la efforts to improve the ability of local governments in 
riL the United States to govern effectively. Over two deca- 
3b des ago Honadle (1986) identified the key elements 
ni involved in capacity building. In her model, CB 
ni includes the ability to:
• • anticipate change
• • make informed decisions about policy
• • develop programs to implement policies
• • attract and absorb resources
• • manage resources
• • evaluate performance (Honadle, 1986: 13-16).
The above list is not composed of unrelated 
h  elements. On the contrary, Honadle described them as 
ß a CB system. The system, in many ways, parallels the 
q prototypical policy process where government actions 
d begin with policy design which are then carried out 
it through a series of programmatic activities followed 
d by implementation and, finally, evaluation. The model, 
v while basic in its design, is useful in identifying some 
o of the key elements of CB used in the United States to 
ii improve local government performance as has been
very much part of the reform tradition since the 1920s 
but especially federal block grant programs from the 
late 1960s through the 1980s. Looking back at this 
period, CB was essentially about technical assistance 
efforts to improve the functioning of local 
governments in several different functional areas such 
as financial management, human resources and 
information technology. And, while there were a range 
of technical assistance providers during this period in 
the United States the type of provider and the form of 
assistance varied based on the interests of the parties 
(see Howitt -  Kobayashi, 1986: 199-38). As I will 
argue below, this tradition of CB -  CB as technical 
assistance -  is still very much alive in the transitional 
countries of Eastern Europe and the countries of the 
former Soviet Union. What is different, as we try to 
articulate below, is that CB is now more expansive and 
includes donor sponsored initiatives that are intended 
to fostor democracy and civil society.
CB in the context of developing and transitional 
countries does not have a standard meaning. It is a 
common term associated with efforts to transform the 
political economies of developing and transitional 
countries. CB is used to describe regime change since
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the demise of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 
and the Soviet Union in 1991. The term is also used to 
describe a myriad of technical assistance projects 
funded by international and bilateral donors. But, for 
donors, CB does not end with technical assistance. 
Rather, donors have operated on the assumption that, by 
building capacity, governance systems and, more 
broadly, civil society, will be enhanced. While there 
seems to be widespread (tacit) agreement among donors 
and those who actually implement projects that CB is an 
essential element of democratic transformation, there is 
actually less clarity about what the term means and how 
it relates to broader system-wide goals.
Why is this topic important? The concept of capacity 
has been part of the lexicon of development administ­
ration for many years. Capacity, particularly when 
pared with other words, evokes a dynamic process 
whereby one can (implicitly) envision, and even even­
tually measure, progress from a given state of political, 
economic and administrative development to an 
improved level. Building capacity implies an image of 
starting from scratch where governments learn skills, 
tools and processes to improve performance (Grindle, 
1997: 5-6). Capacity strengthening, in contrast, 
suggests enhancements to specific elements of govern­
ment such as human resources or budget processes to 
move performance from an existing level to a higher 
level (Grindle, 1997: 7). Notice that capacity whether 
one builds it or strengthens it, has both descriptive and 
evaluative elements. While descriptive efforts to 
explain CB abound in the literature, invariably accounts 
of CB in specific countries tend to prescribe strategies 
that are more or less likely to have positive outcomes 
based on either benchmarking or an assessment by a 
bilateral donor such as the United States Agency for 
International development (USAID) or an international 
donor such as the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP).
Macro and Micro Dimensions: What capacity is to 
be built, developed or strengthened?
CB has been applied to both macro and micro 
levels of transition -  and this contributes to some of 
the conceptual muddle. The reason, in brief, is that CB 
is interchangeably used to refer to personnel, 
organizations and societal institutions. Macro level CB 
is really about institutions and how they shape 
governance. If CB is linked to governance, it would be 
conceptually important to include broad societal 
changes invoking new institutional forms and value 
transformations that go well beyond specific
management improvements. This macro perspective 
has been embraced by USAID in a monograph that 
draws links among improving governance, civil society 
institutions and the building of administrative capacity 
at the local level (Brinkerhoff, 1998). Macro 
dimensions establish a set of necessary conditions that 
precede specific management interventions. This would 
suggest that transitional countries would need to have 
certain preconditions in place if CB interventions are to 
succeed. These preconditions may include a minimum 
level of economic development, a threshold of political 
stability and receptivity of the governing elite to 
change. Another way to portray macro conditions is the 
now well known concept of social capital -  a set of 
values and collective behaviors that provide the bedrock 
from which specific governance enhancements flow 
(Brinkerhoff, 1998). Macro conditions establish the 
environment within which capacity, especially local 
government capacity, can be assessed.
How would interventions presumably influence 
macro dimensions of capacity? We can answer the 
question inferentially by noting some of the bi-lateral 
donor programs and considering both the incentives of 
the donors and the recipients of assistance. For over a 
decade donors have financed projects designed to 
tackle corruption, transparency of governmental 
processes, rule of law initiatives, political party 
development and citizen participation. Projects have 
also targeted economic reforms, especially price 
liberalization, privatization and banking reforms. 
Donors have also encouraged the creation of a vibrant 
third sector and this has led to the proliferation of non­
governmental organizations (NGOs) and voluntary 
organizations. Taken together, we can think of these 
initiatives as strategies to produce good governance 
and strong civil societies or, what I am calling macro 
dimensions of capacity.
What are plausible explanations for donor aid 
aimed at macro dimensions of CB like those 
mentioned above? When the donor is a government it 
seems reasonable to assume that strategic interests will 
have a major impact on the aid decision. To put it 
another way, CB is simply one form of foreign aid and 
will likely be used to advance the donor’s national 
interests. International donors such as the development 
banks have an interest in supporting economic growth 
and stability. To the extent that current research 
demonstrates a positive relationship between macro 
CB and these two economic objectives it makes sense 
to support activities that enhance macro CB initiatives.
Macro approaches by their very nature tend to 
focus on central government ministries and offer either
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Three Drivers of Public Sector Reform
Figure 1
Source: World Bank, „Reforming Public Institutions and Strengthening Governance: A World Bank 
Strategy,” April 2002, p. 7.
implicitly or sometimes explicitly models of democ­
racy drawn from western experience (Wedel, 1998: 
16). The building of capacity from this perspective 
includes major market oriented economic reforms and 
governmental changes to support them. This is why 
economic reforms, whether they took the form of 
„shock therapy” in the early 1990s in Poland and 
Russia, or gradualism, was eventually followed by a 
series of donor-inspired governance efforts to raise the 
profile of administrative reforms in government, tackle 
corruption, promote the rule of law and support the 
development of the third sector. Naturally little would 
change without improvements in personnel; therefore, 
various workshops and training programs have been 
financed by donors to affect changes in values and 
behavior since both are necessary if economic and 
political reforms are to take root. One severe critic of 
western aid to Eastern Europe in the 1990s pointed out 
that these efforts often ignored the innate strengths that 
existed in the recipient countries; instead, aid targeted 
selected „favorites” thereby failing to penetrate deeply 
into the respective transitional societies (Wedel, 1998). 
One is reminded here of Putnam’s earlier work (1983) 
on social capital, Making Democracy Work. The study 
shows how some of the elements of civil society are 
nurtured over very long periods of time thereby giving 
pause to externally financed donor initiatives that are 
supposed to redress substantial historical civil society 
deficits in relatively short order.
The World Bank’s emphasis on str8 measures 
(hhtp://www 1 .worldbank.org/publicsector/indicators. 
htm). Descriptive and evaluative indicators are useful
because they allow researc­
hers to search for patterns in 
the political economy of 
transition, identify major 
institutional requirements as­
sociated with good gover­
nance and provide bench­
marks that can be used for 
assessing progress by indivi­
dual countries. For example, 
some development specialists 
have argued that the creation 
of a viable non-governmental 
sector is essential for liberal 
democracies. Struyk (2002) 
views non-governmental or­
ganizations (NGOs) as central 
to policies and practices that 
devolve responsibilities to lower level governments 
that, in turn, employ NGOs as local service providers. 
At the macro level a viable third sector is usually 
associated with a vibrant civil society. While there is 
general consensus that NGOs are a positive force in 
the evolution of civil society, there is less agreement 
about evaluative criteria to assess NGOs. A mere count 
of NGOs is clearly a flawed indicator since we now 
know from the experience of transitional countries that 
some NGOs may be poorly managed; some are not 
truly independent from government and sustainability 
is often a challenge. More broadly, a sobering 
conclusion of case studies of NGOs in post communist 
countries states, „In nearly every case the investigators 
found that the new institutions had weak links to their 
own societies” (Mendelson -  Glenn, 2002: 22).
USAID, in some of its literature, mirrors the 
perspective of the World Bank takes an expansive 
view of CB by intertwining both macro and micro 
dimensions. In fact, USAID portrays local govern­
ments as the building blocks of democracy and civil 
society. Consider the following from the website of 
USAID’s Local Government Center:
“The democratization agenda speaks of free 
elections, the protection of human rights, openness and 
transparency in the workings of government, the active 
participation of an informed citizenry, and the 
accountability of public officials to their constituents. 
These qualities assume their most immediate form in 
cities and towns, where government functions in 
immediate proximity to the people and organizations it 
serves” (http://www.usaid.gov/regions/europe eurasia/
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dem local gov/brascii.htm). The USAID statement 
goes on to describe several attributes of effective local 
governments and it summarizes the agency’s approach 
to CB by including broad macro dimensions such as 
legal and policy reform at the center and micro di­
mensions aimed at municipal governments such 
professionalization of personnel and municipal prac­
tices, the identification and replication of innovative 
practices, and the creation of municipal professional 
associations (www.usaid.gov/regions/europe eurasia/ 
dem local gov/brascii.htm).
USAID’s portrait of CB lumps broad concepts such 
as the promotion of democracy and civil society with 
specific local government needs such as skills 
development in specific areas like budgeting and 
financial management. USAID has funded a variety of 
projects for more than a decade that have been broad 
gauge and others that are narrowly targeted. The list is 
quite extensive and includes specific housing programs 
in several countries, citizen participation, strategic 
planning, and financial administration. Despite over a 
decade of projects there is no model linking macro and 
micro dimensions of capacity in a conceptually elegant 
way. One veteran development administration specialist 
was particularly critical of the expansive use of CB and 
argued that CB is fundamentally about human resource 
management -  specifically, improving the skills and 
quality of government personnel (Cohen, 1995). Cohen 
went further to draw the direct connection between 
personnel and performance. „Given limited resources 
and the pressing problem of improving governmental 
performance, it is essential to target capacity building 
on specific types of personnel” (1995: 411). From his 
perspective CB should focus on the recruitment, 
training and retention of skilled personnel for 
strategically placed government organizations if 
performance is to be improved.
There is no doubt among both scholars and 
practitioners in development that improving human 
resources is a key element in CB. But human resources 
management as the key CB challenge is not without its 
conceptual and operational problems (Honadle, 2001). 
Measures such as educational achievement as a proxy 
for the quality of human resources have been used to 
gauge CB; however, using education as a crude 
indicator for quality in Eastern Europe would 
misdiagnose CB needs since formal levels of 
education are actually high by international standards. 
Donors have quite rightly observed human resource 
deficits in the region. Yet, while many technical 
assistance projects have tried to improve the quality of
government personnel in the region, they have gone 
beyond skills development to try to change value 
changes held about institutions and processes -  clearly 
a more expansive notion of human resources CB.
Fiscal decentralization
Macro and micro dimensions are linked through 
decentralization initiatives. There seems to be near 
universal agreement among development specialists 
and international and bi-lateral donors that 
decentralization is a desirable objective for transition 
countries because of the assumption that since local 
governments are „closer to the people” they will more 
likely to be responsive to collective preferences rather 
than the central government (World Bank, 2001; see 
Blair, 1998 for a description of USAID efforts in six 
countries. For a critique of decentralization see, Azfar 
et al., 1999). A host of positive attributes are associated 
with decentralization including enhanced accounta­
bility, a closer correspondence between willingness-to- 
pay for services and the higher likelihood that 
corruption will be controlled in decentralized systems 
than in centralized systems (see Azfar, et al, 1999). 
Returning to figure 1, decentralization is at the center 
of the overlapping concentric circles and this indicates 
that the various drivers that promote public sector 
reform should also foster decentralization.
Strategies to advance the process of decentrali­
zation have been advocated by international and bi­
lateral donors for over a decade (see Cohen -  Peterson, 
1999). Projects vary, of course, but they all tend to 
have the objective of strengthening the role of local 
governments in public affairs and encouraging local 
governments to be „laboratories” for democracy. Yet, 
even tough there is consensus about the goal of 
decentralization, there is less agreement about the 
actual measures that reveal progress (or lack thereof) 
toward the goal.
Fiscal decentralization shows more promise. 
Prescriptions about the optimal characteristics of a 
sound intergovernmental fiscal structure have 
permeated public finance for over four decades and 
have served as the bases for specific recommendations 
to transitional countries. Consider the following list 
that is taken from a final report on municipal finance 
reform proposals for Bulgaria, authored by researchers 
from the Urban Institute and financed by USAID:
• Local governments should have adequate own
source revenues.
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• • Local resources should include local taxes and fees;
local governments should set their own rates for 
taxes and fees.
• • Resources of local governments should be adequate
to fulfill responsibilities given to local 
governments.
• • Local governments should have a say in how
resources collected by the central government are 
allocated to local governments.
• • Local governments should have access to capital
markets so they can borrow funds to finance 
infrastructure projects (McCullough et al., 2000: 6).
The single most common indicator of fiscal 
ob decentralization is own source revenue as a percentage 
lo of total revenue. The concept is imprecise. Ebei and 
iiY Yilmaz (2002), drawing on a framework from the 
iO Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop- 
3m ment (OECD), show that subnational revenues can be 
i^o organized into three categories -  tax revenues, non-tax 
lift funds and intergovernmental grants. Next, it is 
mi important to determine whether local governments 
ßri have significant control over the tax base and the tax 
IßT rate. If the answer is in the affirmative, we can say that 
30Í local governments have control over own source 
f3T revenues. Ebei and Yilmaz review the revenue 
il2 structure of six transitional countries and show that 
lug subnational governments have little control over their 
ail fiscal destinies (2002: 9). Since fiscal decentralization 
ú  is so widely touted as a positive goal to strive for in 
btJ transitional countries, more fiscal autonomy, as 
im measured by the percentage of revenue that is 
oo controlled by local governments is an indicator of 
mi improved capacity.
)J Local government capacity
At first blush the concept of capacity seems to be 
>m more straightforward when we focus specifically on the 
oo core functions of local government that would enhance 
ifh their performance. In one form or another, the functions 
iLd turn on effective management practices and this would 
qß apply to local governments anywhere, not only 
Dg governments in developing and transitional countries. 
O  Consider a study financed by the Pew Charitable Trusts 
riJ that was conducted by researchers at the Maxwell 
>2 School of Syracuse University known as the New 
si Jersey Initiative. According to the study, management 
so capacity is „government’s intrinsic ability to marshal, 
)b develop, direct and control its human, physical, and 
ni information capital to support the discharge of its policy 
ib directions. That is, management capacity concerns the
extent to which a government has the right resources in 
the right place at the right time” (Maxwell School, 
2002: 9). Notice that the statement hints at specific 
functions that are elements of management-human 
resources, information technology, local finance, for 
example—and indicators that can show movement or, 
more specifically, improvement. This framework would 
characterize CB as a process of targeted interventions 
on specific management functions. This is consistent 
with Grindle’s point: „the term capacity building is 
intended to encompass a variety of strategies that have 
to do with increasing the efficiency, effectiveness, and 
responsiveness of government performance” (Grindle, 
1997: 5). So, even though the New Jersey Initiative 
targeted municipalities in the state and New Jersey and 
Grindle clearly is referring to developing countries the 
approach to CB is quite similar. The approach has three 
logical stages. First, a model is developed that identifies 
core competencies central to local government capacity. 
Second, indicators for each core competency are 
developed and used to assess progress between two 
time periods for each competency. Third, an overall 
assessment is provided that gives a summary estimate 
of local government capacity for the municipalities 
under review. In principle, this allows for comparison 
across municipalities and over time. Technical 
assistance projects funded by bilateral donors have 
emphasized core competencies as the fundamental 
feature of CB. The final reports of several USAID 
funded projects in Eastern Europe over the past decade 
show a predictable approach to international 
development. The diagnostic initial step surveys core 
competencies followed by a plan for remediation. The 
goal is generally to enhance the skills of local 
employees through a series of interventions -  
workshops, train-the-trainer programs, and pilot 
projects -  intended to enhance local government 
performance.
An intriguing paper from a researcher at the World 
Bank suggests that the lack of integrity at the local 
level hampers CB (ww Lworldbank.org/wbiep/ 
decentralization/topic 13). Building integrity is not 
about building skills but, rather, instilling values. 
According to this perspective CB should focus on 
integrity enhancing mechanisms -  reducing corruption 
by instituting measures such as transparency and 
accountability processes, financial disclosure require­
ments, competitive bidding and other mechanisms 
associated with open government. What is important 
about this perspective is that it shows how CB and 
integrity are intertwined in any serious efforts to 
improve government performance.
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While the notion of linking capacity to integrity is 
appealing, it does not enhance conceptual clarity since 
it brings us back to a macro perspective about CB. If 
capacity is about fundamental values such as integrity, 
then CB would really be about the long term gestation 
of significant value changes that should be 
preconditions of specific operational improvements to 
organizations, personnel and their performance. There 
is some logic in this perspective. Consider the issue of 
corruption. There are two ways one could think about 
corruption. Corruption could be approached as a series 
of „technical” challenges involving pay levels, ac­
countability measures and enforcement mechanisms. 
Alternatively, corruption can be viewed at the macro 
level as a problem of societal values that would need 
to change before operational measures would likely 
succeed. Interesting work by Miller, Grodeland and 
Koshechkina (1998) shows that the giving of „gifts” to 
government employees -  a more neutral word than 
bribes -  is widespread in Eastern Europe and accepted 
as a routine way of doing business. Indicators such as 
Transparency International’s corruption index or the 
European Barometer Survey do help to gauge changes 
in societal values but these measures do not inform the 
impacts of governmental efforts to reduce corruption 
at the operational level.
Financial management and CB
It is easier to discern bi-lateral and international 
donor support for specific operational CB efforts in the 
area of financial management. Financial management 
is on every organization’s CB list and a review of 
projects throughout the region shows consistency in 
topics and approaches. For the purposes of this paper 
we define financial management as a system through 
which governments „levy taxes to operate and use tax 
money to fund public functions with strict 
management through budgeting and appropriating, 
checking and controlling, and reporting and auditing” 
(The New Jersey Initiative: 33). The following criteria 
have been used to assess financial management 
practices at the local level in the United States:
• Government has a multiyear perspective on 
budgeting.
• Government has mechanisms that preserve stability 
and fiscal health.
• Sufficient financial information is available to 
policymakers, managers, and citizens.
• Government has appropriate control over financial 
operations (New Jersey Initiative: 13)
Financial management practices in countries of 
transition rarely meet the standards above. Rather, 
consultants have tended to focus on core competencies 
that include budget process guidelines, the elements of 
financial transparency, and selected practices 
surrounding capital budgeting decisions and 
infrastructure financing. In countries where local 
officials have little experience with financial 
management practices, consultants have worked with 
local associations, pilot cities, initiated train-the- 
trainers workshops and conducted training sessions to 
initiate local government personnel in the key 
elements of a local government budget process from 
budget preparation, review and legislative approval. 
Clearly, the role of the local legislative body was 
crucial since elected legislators tended to have very 
little experience with their roles and responsibilities in 
making appropriations decisions and monitoring 
expenditures of line agencies.
Even with a supposedly technical subject area like 
financial management, the line between skills 
development and the broader conceptual qualities of 
CB is blurred. Specifically, the concepts of 
accountability and transparency have been new 
concepts in most transitional countries; therefore, the 
challenges are not only related to lack of knowledge 
and lack of skills but, in addition, one of mindset and 
orientation. Fiscal decentralization is instructive here 
because local governments in many countries 
remained very dependent of central government 
resources throughout the 1990s. While the experiences 
throughout Eastern Europe and the countries of the 
former Soviet Union vary during this period, suffice it 
to say that most countries passed legislation that, in 
principle, increased local government autonomy, but 
the actual implementation of the legislation varies 
greatly from country to country. Implementation of 
fiscal decentralization initiatives has been influenced 
both by the knowledge and skills of local government 
personnel and political will.
The case of Serbia
In this section I use the case of Serbia to illustrate 
some of the dimensions of CB that have been identified 
in the previous sections. Serbia is hardly the typical 
transitional country given its history since 1991; 
nevertheless, current attention to the country by bi­
lateral and international donors mirrors efforts that have 
been made in other, more stable, countries. This section 
describes the history of local governments in Serbia and 
then describes and analyzes selected CB efforts.
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Serbia has a long and complicated history. Suffice 
Ji it to say that, for the purposes of this paper, I will be 
>1 focusing on one republic in the latest incarnation of the 
>3 country that is now called Serbia and Montenegro. 
i2 Serbia and Montenegro is a federal republic with a 
;q parliamentary form of government with a relatively 
la strong, directly elected President in each republic.
The history of Serbia is marked by distinct 
so oscillations between periods of vitality of local govern- 
m ments, and times when local autonomy was stripped by 
fi a highly centralized state. For example, during the 
)q period of Ottoman rule, minimal local authority existed 
m mostly at the village level. But, given the difficulties of 
[n ruling a large empire, the Turkish rulers appointed local 
ni individuals to manage specific tasks such as tax 
33 collection. This modest amount of local authority, 
iq primarily a matter of convenience for the Ottoman 
in rulers, provided a modicum of self governance that 
)D continued after the demise of the Ottoman Empire.
Although the 19th century witnessed fluctuations in 
ol local government autonomy, it was not until the 
io creation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1918, that 
ol local self-government underwent a series of structural 
io changes that, in the broadest sense, established 
m municipalities as we know them today. Through new 
ßl laws and decisions by King Aleksandar, local seif­
ig government moved from a three-tier organizational 
Jg structure between 1921 and 1929, to a hierarchy of 
)ß administrative regions in 1929 (region, county and 
m municipality). In 1934, city municipalities were
0 officially differentiated from other types of 
m municipalities. While municipalities were officially 
31 recognized, their power was greatly limited. Municipal 
!£ assemblies depended on the approval of the two higher 
>ß administrative levels to make financial decisions. 
T Furthermore, municipal leadership could be disbanded 
d by the decision of a higher administrative region head.
After World War II and the creation of Marshall 
T Tito’s federal political structure, local autonomy 
a experienced a renaissance in socialist Yugoslavia. This 
v was done to accommodate the political realities of the 
n republics with their variation in religions, ethnicities 
£ and different levels of economic development. The
1 People’s Liberation Committees, the basic units of 
>1 local decision-making during World War II, became 
[J the post-war building blocks of local self-government. 
\  A 1952 law officially established the People’s 
) Committees, bicameral entities with local decision- 
1 making power. Advisory subcommittees were formed 
1 to handle areas of local public concern such as 
3 education, health, and agriculture. For the first time, 
i referenda were introduced as an official way of 1
gauging public opinion and local budgets were funded 
both through local taxes and state transfers.
Tito’s brand of socialism encouraged, at least at a 
superficial level, some support for the ideological 
principle of the „vanishing state.” People’s communes, 
not local governments per se, were the basic 
organizing units of society. In this communal system, 
governance happened from the bottom up, instituted 
and led by the citizens themselves. Citizens 
participated through referenda and the formation of 
citizen action groups. Neighborhood organizations 
were introduced at the sub-municipal level. While the 
authority of these local units was limited, the 
neighborhood organizations provided another conduit 
for public participation in local government.
The Yugoslav federation broke apart in 1991 and 
war ravaged the former Yugoslav states through most of 
the decade -  a history that is familiar to informed 
readers of current events. There is no need to dwell on 
the Milosevic era other than to point out that political 
power was highly centralized thereby eviscerating any 
of the vestiges of Tito’s decentralization efforts. While 
municipalities still remained the main form of local 
government, they had very little real authority. During 
this period, the Serbian government passed two laws on 
local self-government, one in 1991 and one in 1999. 
Unfortunately, neither one truly protected the rights of 
local self-government. For both laws, the municipality 
was seen not as an autonomous unit, but rather as an 
extension of the central government’s power. The laws 
did little to differentiate between the powers origina­
ting in the local government and those transferred to it 
from the state. Local governments operated within the 
powers explicitly allowed them by the central govern­
ment, and the government of Serbia had the power to 
dismiss the municipal assembly and invalidate local 
statutes.
The outcome of the 2002 elections signaled the 
most recent turnaround in the status of Serbian local 
government. Democratization efforts following 
Milosevic’s political demise have once again 
reemphasized the importance of strong and transparent 
local government. Following a decade of war, state- 
level corruption, international sanctions and economic 
decline, Serbia is once again turning toward an earlier 
tradition of community participation and self- 
government. A new Law on Local Government was 
passed in February 2002 giving greater authority to 
local government, and establishes the legal process for 
appointing municipal and city officials. The law 
decentralizes state power and brings Serbia one step 
closer to European standards of governance. The law
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that took effect on March 6, 2002, gives mayors and 
municipal heads greater authority, allows the forma­
tion of national minority councils in municipalities 
with ethnically mixed populations, and introduces the 
ombudsman institution to local self-government. The 
law takes initial steps toward reforming Serbian 
institutions and governmental relations, but the actual 
process of reform is still tentative making this law 
transitional at best.
Characteristics of Serbian Municipalities
Most Serbian municipalities follow a typical design 
of an urban center surrounded by a number of village 
centers. The capital city of Belgrade (2 million inhabi­
tants) and the cities of Novi Sad (300,000), Nis 
(250,000) and Kragujevac (170,000) are officially 
distinguished as cities. City status entitles the four 
jurisdictions to a greater share of federal tax revenues 
than other local governments.
Serbian municipalities are rather large in 
comparison with other European municipalities and 
have on average 60,000 inhabitants. By comparison, 
French municipalities have, on average, 1,500 
inhabitants, German 5,000, Swedish 20,000 and 
British 40,000 inhabitants. Municipalities in 
Vojvodina, the northern Serbian province, are on 
average more economically developed then other 
Serbian municipalities due, in part, to the historical 
influence of the Austro-Hungarian Empire that had 
fairly developed standards of urban governance 
processes including various forms of citizen 
participation. In contrast, municipalities in the middle 
and western parts of Serbia are not as well spatially 
arranged and vary more by wealth and type of 
economic activities. Cacak and Gornji Milanovac, for 
example, are economically successful cities of small 
and medium enterprises with developed entrepre­
neurial culture, while Uzice, Kraljevo, Kragujevac and 
Smederevo are industrial and service cities (all in 
decline). Going further east and south, we find the 
least developed Serbian municipalities. There, the 
remnants of the Turkish Empire’s rule are still evident 
in the architectural and cultural traditions of the land. 
Light industry is dominant in this region. Nib is the 
most developed industrial, university and service 
center. Leskovac, Pirot and Vranje are smaller but well 
developed centers. On east Majdanpek and Bor are 
mine centers and Negotin has developed chemical 
industry. Novi Pazar in the southwest is traditionally 
famous trade center with dominant Bosnian popula­
tion, in which economy of small and middle 
enterprises blossom.
Under the new law on municipalities governments 
have a wide range of service obligations; however, 
there is a lack of clarity as to what functions are 
obligatory and which ones are optional. The present 
scope of local government services is mostly identical 
to classical functions: water and gas supply, sewage 
system, cleaning, collecting and waste disposal, 
central heating, public transport and infrastructure, 
kindergartens; primary education and health care, 
housing, planning and urbanism, cultural institutions 
(museums, library and theaters), social support, 
environmental protection, sport and recreation and 
economic activities. In order to realize all these 
competences successfully local government needs 
permanent and adequate sources of finance. Fiscal and 
financial autonomy is at the very core of local 
autonomy. The Serbian parliament passed legislation 
that is aimed at clarifying the nature of municipal 
property and specifying the budgetary conditions of 
municipalities in the country. While the legislation is 
intended to outline the fiscal character of local 
governments in Serbia by making finances more 
transparent, the key problem of financial autonomy for 
local governments remains a most pressing problem 
since the fiscal structure is still centralized. 
Municipalities still do not have their own property 
(and therefore are not legal entities), and do not have 
the authority to create and raise municipal taxes. 
Pricing and fee setting for local government services 
are haphazard at best, nor is there a rational way to sort 
out financing responsibilities between the central 
government and the local governments when central 
government agencies use municipal services like 
buildings, roads, water and sewage, and electricity, 
without any budgetary offsets for the municipalities.
Local government revenues can be grouped into 
two categories, own source revenues and shared 
revenues. Own source revenues include communal 
taxes such as taxes on building space, fees for using 
municipal capital stock and income from economic 
activities and services. Shared taxes are all taxes that 
are shared between the central government and local 
governments. The most important are the sales tax and 
the income tax. They alone make up more than two- 
thirds of local budgets. Other taxes include taxes on 
property, on inheritances and gifts, and traffic fees.
Total revenues for all municipal budgets in 
Serbia for 2002 were 450 million EUROS. Given the 
size of Serbian municipalities, on average, the budgets 
of Serbian municipalities are 150 to 200 times smaller 
than those of municipalities in Western Europe. During 
the decade of the 1990s municipal budgets continually
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ia eroded and, by almost any measure, have been 
ni insufficient to cover basic citizens' needs. In 2001, the 
id budgets were doubled through the inclusion of taxes 
io on sources previously considered to be part of the 
„gray economy” (taxes on cigarettes, alcohol and 
38 selected luxury goods), and through adjustments 
id because of inflation.
On the expenditure side, municipal budgets are 
id barely able to support basic communal services; 
so capital projects have been ignored for years. Even the 
m maintenance costs of basic infrastructure such as water 
iß and sewers, public buildings, streets and roads, and 
jq public transportation are severely underfinanced. The 
B8 same pattem applies to primary education, health care, 
Lio cultural events and social assistance where needs 
ni invariably outstrip available resources.
Q Developing Local Government Capacity for 
M Municipalities in Serbia
Given the conditions of local government in Serbia 
3b described in the previous section, it is not surprising 
r£j that bilateral and international donors are now funding
0  CB initiatives. The Serbian Local Government 
3T Performance Program (SLGRP) is a four-year program 
ni initiated in October 2001 by the consulting firm 
Q Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI), under contract 
oJ to USAID. Funded at $24.7 million, SLGRP expects to 
w work with fifty Serbian municipalities „to improve 
m municipal management and capacity in the following 
iß areas: Citizen Participation, Information Technology, 
ft Financial Management, and Communal Enterprise 
M Management” (About SLGRP, n.d.). SLGRP’s goals 
Iß also include strengthening the Standing Conference of 
>T Towns and Municipalities, the Yugoslav municipal 
2ß association, and support for policy reform. The areas
10 of CB are as follows:
Financial Management -  defined as the ability of
01 local government to set public service fees, adopt local 
bJ tax levy rates, and implement local policy to meet 
>n needs of the local populations. Included in this area are 
if financial management tools such as accountability and
11 transparency (Serbian Local Government Reform 
q Program, www.slgrp.usaid.org.yu , January 16, 2003).
Communal Enterprise -  defined as working on 
„improving the management, technical operations and 
q public relations of the communal enterprises through 
it training and technical assistance, while at the same 
ii time capitalizing on opportunities to reform policy and 
d fostering linkages to sources for capital project 
ft funding.” SLGRP hopes to accomplish this by:
I 1) Conducting Management Training 
I 2) Improving Operations and Maintenance 
I 3) Increasing Public Accountability 
I 4) Establishing Community-Based Service Standards 
I 5) Increasing Access to Technical Developments in
Operations
Information Technology -  LGRP is enhancing IT 
j support for everyday functioning of Serbian 
I municipalities. It does so by:
j -  upgrading data management and communication 
I systems in local government;
I -  establishing a national internet-based municipal 
j information system;
! -  providing municipal management software training 
j municipal staff in basic information technology
i applications (http://www.slgrp.usaid.org.yu/eng/
j six areas/inf technology.html).
Citizen Participation -  is defined as „including 
j citizens in decision-making and of ensuring that 
I municipal government is a service-oriented operation. 
I Citizens and NGO’s should feel that municipal 
j government is accountable to them. The citizen parti- 
! cipation is supposed to increase citizen satisfaction 
I with and confidence in their democratic municipal 
I governments, as measured by changes in specific 
j attitudes about the municipality’s overall performance, 
j openness, and inclusiveness in decision making” 
I (http://www.slgrp.usaid.org.yu/eng/six_areas/asc_dev 
! elopment.html).
j Association Development -  refers to the effort to 
j support the Standing Conference of Towns and 
j Municipalities of Yugoslavia. „As the organization of 
j local governments, the Standing Conference can 
j become a major instrument for increasing the capacity 
j and competence of local governments, their leaders 
j and staff.”
Policy Reform -  means „to support the develop- 
j ment of institutional, advocacy, and policy research 
I environment that will facilitate the continuous 
j improvement of Serbia’s system of local democracy, 
j including the further decentralization of public servi- 
I ces to appropriate levels of sub-national government, 
j The Policy Reform Team exists to improve the abili- 
! ties of all relevant stakeholders to engage in informed 
j and constructive policy analysis, formulation, and 
j debate” (http://www.slgrp.usaid.org.yu/eng/six areas/ 
I pol reform.html).
The areas selected are part of a program put toget- 
! her by DAI under contract to USAID for a multiyear
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project aimed at improving the capacity of local 
governments in Serbia. The SELGRP project has a 
straightforward logic that combines efforts to promote 
policy reform, provide training and technical 
assistance, build capacity and enhance the ability of 
local governments to advocate on their collective 
behalf in national politics. Fifty local governments are 
expected to participate in the program by 2005. A 
careful look at the structure of SLGRP illustrates the 
interaction of macro and micro dimensions of CB and 
descriptive and prescriptive components as well. This 
is illustrated in figure 2.
It would be a stretch to call this a model. Rather, 
SLRP seems to combine many of the features of CB 
that have been outlined throughout this paper. For 
example, the project, like many projects that have been 
funded throughout Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union over the past twelve years, presumes that 
decentralization is a prerequisite for democratic 
transition. This is what the overriding policy reform is 
all about. Everything that follows from this belief is 
designed to help Serbian officials and citizens at the 
local level develop both the political and technical 
capacity to govern effectively. To accomplish this 
broad goal, SLGRP tries to facilitate a change in 
political culture while providing concrete skills to 
local government employees. A simple example comes 
from the area of financial management which, in the
Figure 2
SLGRP framework, includes the introduction of public 
budget hearings as an integral part of financial 
management. Clearly what the project is trying to do is 
to nurture democratic values by changing the ethos of 
public officials -  by implementing mechanisms that 
advance transparency and accountability. This is seen in 
the following testimonial of the head of the Economy 
Department of Loznica who commented, „The most 
important thing SLGRP taught us is that everyone must 
take part in the strategic planning process. That means 
all parties -  those in power and those that are not.. .and 
all the citizens” (SLGRP Newsletter, Issue No. 2 
December 2002 -  March 2003, p. 5).
Clearly SLGRP takes an expansive view of CB. 
Capacity is viewed not only as a series of specific 
skills building initiatives for local government 
employees but, rather, a broad effort to transform 
governance at the local level in Serbia. Again, 
testimonials provide a clue to SLGRP’s orientation. In 
the project’s December 2002 -  March 2003 newsletter 
there is an article with the heading, „Fear of the 
window clerk tops list of citizen concerns” (SLGRP 
Newsletter Issue No. 2 December 2002 -  March 2003, 
p.l). The image, to anyone with experience in Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union is clear: It is the 
image of a rather low level municipal employee who is 
supposed to provide „front line” service to citizens 
who simultaneously exerts arbitrary power, indiffe­
rence to service and performan­
ce, and even incompetence -  
with little or no oversight from 
superiors. Given this reality 
SLGRP has, as one of its goals, 
the intention to change this cul­
ture. The story continues, „Sin­
ce the very essence of democ­
racy lies in the decentralization 
of authority and increased 
community control, it is local 
government which must provi­
de the greatest degree of trans­
parency and accountability” 
(SLGRP Newsletter, Issue No. 
2: December 2002 -  March 
2003, p.l). It is not surprising, 
therefore, that the most recent 
issue of the project’s newsletter 
has announced the opening of 
the first citizen assistance cen­
ter in Serbia in Zrenjanin City 
Hall to improve the quality of 
services to residents by spe-
Serbia Local Government Reform Program
Policy Reform: to support the devolution of 
authority and control to municipal govern­
ment
Training: to improve public administration 
practice in key areas of management and 
citizen services
Technical Assistance: to apply training and 
SLGRP resources to specific technical prob­
lems and develop costumized solutions
Capacity: to institutionalize municipal man­
agement as a professional discipline by de­
veloping Serbian staff and investing in new 
management systems
Advocady: to improve the ability of muni­
cipal government to represent its collective 
interests in the future
Source: Serbia Local Government Reform Program, „Program Implementation Update -  One 
Year Later," Development Alternatives, Inc., contract: EEU-1-00-99-00012-00, Task Order 803, 
processed, nd.
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33 eding up the process of providing documents, 
la eliminating the physical barrier between employee and
10 citizens and inculcating the value of service in 
3g government employees. What is important about these 
a i recent efforts is not the effectiveness of the initiatives, 
iia since it is much too soon to assess their impact, but the 
;oi logic behind them. SLGRP, like many USAID funded 
iq projects in the region approaches CB broadly and 
38 seems to draw (implicit) connections among systemic 
sb decentralization goals, very specific skills training and 
>fü the ultimate goal of building civil society.
zl Is Serbia Different?
The recent history of Serbia suggests that building 
bo capacity at the local level would be different from the 
X3 experiences in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
iU Union. While there is no single transition trajectory, the 
•fig sad history of the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s, 
83 especially the rule of Slobodan Milosevic, the ethnic 
>b cleansing in Kosovo, the subsequent NATO bombing of 
Serbia, the popular uprising against Milosevic 
ol following his attempt to steal an election followed by 
>rb the ongoing war crimes trial in the Hague would all 
JJ8 suggest that Serbia’s challenges are different and more 
03 complicated. Yet, the CB effort as illustrated by the 
12 SLGRP project follows a well established framework. 
IT The project adapts conceptual approaches and training 
im methods that have been used throughout the region for 
/o over a decade to the Serbian local context. The project 
qß appears to be a blend of conventional wisdom, or what 
m might be called a „CB transition paradigm” with its 
ns embedded „best practices” derived from previous CB 
rq projects in other transition countries. CB personnel tend 
ol to move around from one transition country to another; 
dl therefore, it is hardly surprising that concepts and 
m methods represent knowledge transfer by default. 
i2 Similarly, CB methods tend to be repeated across the 
3i region -  workshops with local government participants, 
iq pilot cities as learning cases and train-the-trainers 
iq programs.
Like earlier USAID funded projects, the approach 
ol to CB in Serbia is multifaceted, includes macro and 
m micro dimensions, and combines skills development 
w with broad normative objectives. Certainly, at the
11 rhetorical level, the Serbia project is consistent with 
J  USAID’s strategy to enhance governance, stimulate 
ib democratic practices at the local level and nurture civil 
>8 society. It is too soon, of course, to assess the project 
b directly. What is clear is that the approach is not new 
o or especially unique to Serbia. Of course Serbia has 
n many features found in other countries in the region -  V
opaque administrative practices, low basic skills of 
government employees, high levels of corruption and 
no substantial history of democratic values. CB in 
Serbia is aimed at improving all of these features of 
governance. Democratic values clearly shape the 
specific goals of developing a professional association 
of Serbian municipalities so that they lobby the central 
government on their collective behalf. Similarly, insti­
tuting open budget hearings and „one-stop shopping” 
processes in selected municipalities are designed to 
enhance transparency and responsiveness. Who can 
quibble with these innovations?
In sum, this paper’s excursion into the concept of 
CB highlights the imprecision of the term. But more 
important than conceptual elegance is the fact that 
projects aimed at enhancing capacity really have had 
very broad and sometimes unclear goals. CB suffers 
from the classic „chicken and egg” problem. Should 
externally funded change agents try to focus on 
initiatives that try to shape core values in the expecta­
tion that improvements in government performance 
will eventually follow? Or, conversely, should the 
focus be the other way around -  attention on technical 
improvements with the expectation that raising skills 
will cumulatively lead to value changes? One could 
interpret this observation as a sequencing dilemma. 
But it is more than this. At root, CB really is about the 
accumulated knowledge that, in principle, comes from 
years of experience in developing and transitional 
countries. But, if there is any truth to my argument, the 
cumulative knowledge is very limited at best. Fiscal 
decentralization is a good example. While there is 
widespread agreement that fiscal decentralization is a 
desirable objective, there is actually little empirical 
evidence about the administrative requirements that 
are necessary conditions for successful decentrali­
zation initiatives. Finally, CB is practically silent about 
the role leadership plays in steering transitions. This is 
not merely an oversight. Rather, it stems, in part, from 
the structure of CB projects that try to instill „hard” 
skills. Yet, more and more evidence shows that 
leadership affects whether or not change will take root.
Nation building, or more accurately, regime 
transforming initiatives obviously take years -  well 
beyond the funding commitments of bilateral and inter­
national donors. This would not, in itself, be proble­
matical if expectations are consistent with political and 
economic realities. Conceptual precision may be an 
elusive goal to strive for in the world of donor funded 
CB projects. Yet, improving conceptual clarity may 
have the value of bringing project expectations in line 
with what is feasible in the medium term.
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